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The Covert Human Intelligence Source 
(Criminal Conduct) Act 2021:  
Making Lawful Criminal Conduct
Introduction 
In April 2021 the UK government passed the Covert 
Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 
2021, which came into force in July 2021. A covert 
human intelligence source, commonly referred to as 
a CHIS, is in police terms an informant or in the se-
curity service terms an agent. For this article they will 
be referred to as informants. With the Act allowing in 
specified conditions informants to participate in crim-
inal conduct, the Government felt it had to legislate 
on this issue following a majority decision of the In-
vestigatory Powers Tribunal that held such action can 
be lawful. In the case, Privacy International and others v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth, and oth-
ers [2019] UKIPTrib IPT_17_186_CH the claimants 
challenged a policy that the Prime Minister acknowl-
edged existed in March 2018 that the Security Service 
(MI5) authorise the commission of criminal offences 
by its agents.   
The challenge was based on seven grounds: 
1. There is no lawful basis for the policy, either in 
statute or at common law.   
2. The policy amounts to an unlawful de facto power 
to dispense with the criminal law.  
3. The secret nature of the policy, both in the past and 
now, means that it is unlawful under domestic princi-
ples of public law.  
4. For the purposes of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), the policy was not and is not 
“in accordance with law”.  
5. Any deprivation of liberty effected pursuant to a 
purported authorisation given under the policy vio-
lates the procedural rights under Article 5 of the 
ECHR.  
6. Supervision of the operation of the policy by the  
Intelligence Services Commissioner in the past, and 
now the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, does not 
satisfy the positive investigative duty imposed by Arti-
cles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and 5 
(right to liberty of the person) of the ECHR.   
7. Conduct authorised under the policy in breach of 
Articles 2, 3, 5 and 6 (right to fair trial) of the ECHR 
is in breach of the negative and preventative obliga-
tions in the ECHR. It is submitted that the policy itself 
is unlawful to the extent that it sanctions or acquiesces 
in such conduct.   
From its beginning both the police and the security 
services have used informants. As in virtually all cases 
informants operate within terrorist or criminal circles, 
their information can be a valuable asset during            
investigations. For many years the governance of           
informants was through internal policy and guidelines 
with no consistency in procedures and it was a prac-
tice that was open to challenge regarding the methods 
as to how informants were recruited and handled. 
Even though Home Office guidelines in handling of 
informants was introduced in 1984 to guarantee a de-
gree of uniformity as to how the police in England and 
Wales handled informants. Following the House of 
Lords decision in R v Khan (Sultan) [1996] 3 WLR 
162 where the Court held the 1984 Home Office 
guidelines were acceptable, Khan took his case to the 
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European Court of Human Rights (Khan v UK [2000] 
8 EHRC 310). Knowing that the guidelines would not 
be seen by the European Court as a document that 
would come under the term ‘in accordance with the 
law’, the government introduced the Regulation of In-
vestigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) governing the re-
cruitment and handling of informants came under 
statutory control. This article will examine the main 
provisions regarding informants in RIPA and assess 
the rationale as to why the 2021 Act was introduced 
amending RIPA by allowing in certain circumstances 
informers to participate in criminal conduct.  
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
Compared to the 1984 Home Office guidelines, in 
essence RIPA tightened up the procedures governing 
the recruitment and use of informants. As anticipated, 
the European Court of Human Rights in Khan v UK 
held that the Home Office guidelines was not an act 
prescribed by law (a statute) which is required under 
the limitations given in article 8 ECHR (right to pri-
vacy) for the state to interfere with this right. Section 
26(8) RIPA defines an informant as one who covertly 
establishes or maintains a personal or other relation-
ship with a target (person or organisation) to obtain 
information or gain access to another person to gain 
information to be passed on to the state agencies. An-
other key change in informant handling is the ac-
companying Codes of Practice that provide guidance 
to the police in applying RIPA when handling infor-
mants. Although a breach of the Codes of Practice will 
not always amount to unlawful action by a police offi-
cer, such a breach is likely to result in any information 
obtained by an informant during an investigation that 
could be used as evidence in a criminal trial being ren-
dered inadmissible. One significant change in RIPA 
and Covert Human Intelligence Sources Codes of 
Practice (CoP) is that under section 29(5) informants 
are managed by a handler and a controller. Under 
paragraph 6.8 of the CoP the controller has to be a 
rank above that of the handler and their role is to 
maintain a general oversight in the use of the infor-
mant by the handler. Under RIPA and the CoP a risk 
assessment is carried out prior to, during and at the 
end of the use of the informant regarding the task 
they are asked to perform, and the likely conse-
quences should it become known that the person was 
an informant.  
Under the previous Home Office guidelines, risk                
assessments were carried out, but the recording of how 
they were managed was not as rigorous as RIPA. Under 
section 29(5) RIPA the handler must report to the con-
troller on a continual basis. In paragraph 6.15 of the 
CoP it outlines that these reports include informing the 
controller when and where any meetings or contact will 
be made with the informant, the conduct of the infor-
mant and the safety and welfare of the informant. 
Under RIPA it is not acceptable for the handler to meet 
the informant on their own without the knowledge of 
their supervisor/line manager acting as a controller, and 
RIPA encourages the handler to be accompanied by a 
colleague during any meetings with the informant. This 
is to provide corroboration that the handler was acting 
ethically with the informant.  
Covert Human Intelligence Source (Criminal  
Conduct) Act 2021 
A long-standing condition under section 27 RIPA is 
when handling informants it has to be ensured they 
do not get involved in carrying out any form of crim-
inal conduct and if they did then they would be arrested 
and potentially charged with offences related to the 
conduct they were involved in. This has changed with 
the introduction of The Covert Human Intelligence 
Source (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 that has amended 
RIPA in relation to handling of informants that allows 
in certain circumstances for the informant to carry out 
criminal conduct. It is important to note that this is only 
permissible in certain circumstances.  
Introducing a new section, section 29B RIPA, it allows 
for the Secretary of State (which in the case informants 
linked to terrorist activity will be the Home Secretary) 
to authorise an informant to carry out criminal con-
duct. The authorisation tasking the informant to carry 
out criminal conduct must be granted at the same time 
as an authorisation is granted to handle the informant 
under section 29 RIPA. Compared to the grounds for 
authorising the handling of an informant under sec-
tion 29, the grounds for an authority tasking an in-
formant to carry out criminal conduct is limited and 
can only be authorised where it is necessary:  
1. When it is in the interests of national security;  
2. For the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or 
of preventing disorder; or  
3. When it is in the interests of the economic well-
being of the UK. 
 
The conditions for this authority are that what is 
sought to be achieved cannot be achieved by conduct 
that would not constitute a crime and that the crimi-
nal conduct that will be carried out is necessary and 
proportionate to what is being sought to be achieved. 
The authorised criminal conduct is conduct carried 
out in connection with the informant that is specified 
in the authorisation, that is carried out for the pur-
pose of or in connection with the investigation or op-
eration specified or described in the authorisation. 
Under section 29B RIPA among the agencies that can 
apply for a criminal conduct authorisation, includes: 
1. Police; 
2. National Crime Agency; 
3. Serious Fraud Office; 
4. Intelligence services; 
5. Armed forces; 
6. HM Revenue and Customs  
The 2021 Act amends section 32 RIPA regarding 
oversight of authorisations by judicial commissioners. 
Where an authorisation to use an informant is issued, 
under section 32A RIPA, approval of the judicial com-
missioner is required before the authorisation can take 
effect. The judicial commissioners will only grant an 
approval if they are satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds for the authorisation. In relation to an au-
thorisation for an informant to carry out criminal con-
duct, the judicial commissioner must have oversight 
of the authorisation and give notice that it is either 
granted or cancelled.  
The grounds for an authorisation allowing an                
informant to carry out criminal conduct are limited 
and the conditions are strict. When looking at the 
grounds, it is anticipated these authorisations will be 
primarily in relation to terrorism investigations or se-
rious organised crime, linked to terrorist groups’ ac-
tivity, where there is potentially a life-threatening 
situation. Section 1 Security Services Act 1989 statuto-
rily defines the role of the UK’s security services which 
is:  
1. The protection of national security, in particular 
protection against threats of espionage, terrorism and 
sabotage, from the activities of foreign states’ agents 
and from actions intended to overthrow or under-
mine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial 
or violent means; [my emphasis]  
2. Safeguard the economic well-being of the UK;  
3. Support the activities of police forces, national 
Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies in 
the prevention and detection of serious crime.  
Echoing the mischief rule on statutory interpretation, 
it appears the intention of the 2021 Act is to place the 
practice of allowing informers to carry out criminal 
conduct, mainly by the UK’s security services, on a 
statutory footing.  
The security service’s practice of authorising some of 
their informers (agents) to carry out criminal conduct 
was addressed by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
(IPT) in Privacy International and others v Secretary of State 
for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and others, where 
the claimants raised the issue that under the UK           
Security Services guidelines allows for the authorisa-
tion of their informants to commit criminal offences. 
As the claimants argued that this practice was contrary 
to a number of rights contained in the European  
Convention on Human Rights, the IPT were                  
requested to examine the lawfulness of the Security 
Services’ guidelines. In paragraph 13 of the Security 
Services guidelines, while it is accepted that RIPA did 
not provide immunity for informers who participated 
in crime, there may be circumstances where:  
‘…it is necessary and proportionate for agents to par-
ticipate in criminality in order to secure or maintain 
access to intelligence that can be used to save life or 
disrupt serious criminality, or to ensure the agent’s 
continued safety, security and ability to pass on such 
intelligence.’  
Paragraph 4 of the Security Services Guidelines state 
that full and accurate records of everything said to an 
agent on the subject of participation and of their re-
sponse, adding the agent must be informed the secu-
rity service authorisation will not bestow immunity 
from prosecution. In relation to running informers in 
terrorism investigations, one aspect where prima facie, 
the informer will be committing an offence under sec-
tion 11 Terrorism Act 2000, where they are a member 
of a terrorist organisation (i.e., a proscribed organisa-
tion as listed in Schedule 2 Terrorism Act 2000). Al-
beit a 3:2 majority verdict, the ICP found that this 
practice was legitimate, saying:  
‘The running of agents, including the running of 
agents who are embedded in an illegal or criminal or-
ganisation … would obviously have been occurring 
before [the introduction of Security Service Act 1989]. 
… The 1989 Act did not create the service for the first 
time: it simply controlled it. It is impossible, in our 
view, to accept that Parliament intended in enacting 
the 1989 Act to bring to an end some of the core ac-
tivities which the Security Service must have been con-
ducting at that time.’  
Citing the Manchester Arena bombing and the          
London terrorist attacks that occurred in 2017, the 
IPT stated these events serve to underline the need 
for intelligence gathering and other activities in order 
to protect the public from serious terrorist threats. On 
the issue as to whether the Security Service has the 
power as a matter of public law to undertake the ac-
tivities of running informants that involve their carry-
ing out criminal conduct, the IPT found that they do 
have that power. 
 
On the question if the action is in accordance with the 
law regarding a violation of article 8 ECHR (right to 
privacy) the IPT found the Secret Service Guidelines 
have a basis in RIPA, which would be within the mean-
ing if ‘in accordance with the law’ as held by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in Zakhorav v Russia 
(2016) 63 EHRR 17 where the Court examined the 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by a national author-
ity in achieving the legitimate aim of protecting na-
tional security, including secret surveillance methods. 
The IPT also held that to claim a violation of article 8 
or other ECHR rights, as the ECHR does not in gen-
eral permit an actio popularis (a remedy by a group in 
the name of a collective interest), it must be the person 
who claims to be a victim of their rights. 
 
Conclusion 
When it was a Bill going through parliament a fact-
sheet was issued by the Home Office stating that the 
Act would not be providing a new capability, rather it 
would provide a clear legal basis for a longstanding 
tactic that is vital for national security and the preven-
tion and detection of crime.  The Home Office see the 
participation in criminal conduct by informers as es-
sential by allowing them to work their way into the 
heart of groups that would cause harm to the public. 
The important aspect to the 2021 Act are the safe-
guards in place sufficient to protect both the agency 
staff, the informer and the potential victim. It might 
have been preferable that rather than a politician, in 
this case the respective secretary of state granting the 
authorisation, it should be the judiciary. This would 
definitely meet the ECHR requirements of judicial 
oversight. However, as the judicial commissioners 
have an oversight in relation to the granting of au-
thorisations, this may suffice. Another aspect to 2021 
Act is there is no coverage of what form of criminal 
conduct would be permissible in these authorisations. 
This was an issue human rights groups, led by Re-
prieve has a major concern with as they said there 
should clear limits to how far informers working un-
dercover in terrorist groups could be allowed to go. 
As covered above, in relation to terrorism the recruit-
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ment of, the handling, and request for the informer to 
carry out criminal conduct would invariably involve a 
member of a terrorist organisation and that in itself is 
an offence. It is important to ascertain the degree of 
seriousness of criminal conduct can the informer carry 
out. For example, it would be totally disagreeable for 
the informer to be party to murder, but it may involve, 
conspiracy or party to planning an act of terrorism 
under section 5 Terrorism Act 2006, where prior to 
the attack the informer will pass on the intelligence 
needed for the agencies to make arrests before the at-
tack occurs. There is no doubt that the 2021 Act is a 
controversial piece of legislation, but one that is nec-
essary. It will be essential that scrutiny and oversight of 
these authorisations, especially by the judicial com-
missioners is robust and not simply a rubber-stamping 
exercise. 
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